Originally a talk delivered at a conference on Bayesian statistics , this article attempts to answer the following question: why is most scientific data analysis cared out in a non-Bayesian framework? The argument consists mainly of some practical examples of data analysis , in which the Bayesian approach is diffcult but Fisherianlfrequentist solutions are relatively easy. There is a brief discussion of objectivity in statistical analyses and of the difficulties of achieving ; objectivity within a Bayesian framework. The aricle ends with a list of practical advantages of Fisherianlfrequentist methods , which so far seem to have outweighed the philosophical superiority of Bayesianism.
INTRODUCTION ayho-

is
The tite is a reasonable question to ask on at least two counts. First of all , everyone used to be a Bayesian. Laplace wholeheartedly endorsed Bayes s formulation of the inference problem , and most 19th-century scientists followed suit. This included Gauss, whose statistical work is usually presented in frequentist terms.
A second and more important point is the cogency of the Bayesian argument. Modem statisticians , following the lead of Savage and de Finetti , have advanced powerful theoretical reasons for preferrng Bayesian inference. A byproduct i of this work is a disturbing catalogue of inconsistencies in the frequentist point of view.
Nevertheless, everyone is not a Bayesian. The current era is the first century in which statistics has been widely used for scientific reporting, and in fact, 20th-century statistics is mainly non-Bayesian. (Lindley (1975) Working together in rather uneasy allance, Fisher and NPW dominate current theory and practice, with Fisherian ideas paricularly prevalent in applied statistics. I am going to tr to explain why. Fisher s theory is a theory of archetypes. For any given problem the correct inference is divined by reduction to an archetypal form for which the correct inference is obvious. The first and simplest archetype is that of making inferences about from one observation in the normal model N(e, 1).
(1)
Fisher was incredibly clever at producing such reductions:
sufficiency, ancilarity, permutation distributions , and asymptotic optimality theory are among his inventions , all intended to reduce complicated problems to something like (1). (It is worth noting that Fisher s work superseded an earlier archetyical inerence system, Karl Pearson s method of moments and familes of frequency curves.
Why is so much of applied statistics cared out in a
Fisherian mode? One big reason is the automatic nature
Fisher s theory. Maximum likelihood estimation is the original jackknife, in Tukey s sense of a widely applicable and dependable tool. Faced with a new situation, the working statistician can apply maximum likelihood in an automatic fashion, with little chance' (in experienced hands) of going far wrong and considerable chance of providing a nearly optimal inference. In short, he does not have to think a lot about the specific situation in order to get on toward its solution.
Bayesian theory requires a great deal of thought about the given situation to apply sensibly. This is seen clearly in Four Basic Statistical Operations and How They Relate to Estimation. Source: Efron (1982b, fig. 2).
NPW theory, for instance, minimax estimation procedures and with the same result: they are not used very much. Not all of statistics is inference. The little diagram of all of statistics in Figure 1 (reprinted from Efron 1982b) stas at the bottom with "enumeration " the collecting and listing of individual datum. The diagram proceeds upward to the reuction of the raw data to more understadable form though the adversaral processes of summar and comparson. This is the par of the analysis where , usually, the statistician decides on a reasonable probabilstic model for the situation.
At the top of the diagram is inference. This is the step that taes us from the data actually seen to data that might be expected in the future.
Bayesian theory concentrates on inference, which is the most glamorous par of the statistical world, but not necessarly the most important par. Fisher paid a lot of attention to the earlier steps of the data analysis. Randomization for instance, and experimental design in general, is a statement about how data should be collected , or " enumerated, " for best use later in the analysis. Maximum likelihood is a provably efficient way to summarze data, no matter what paricular estimation problems are going to be involved in the final inference (Efron 1982b) . The NPW school has also contrbuted to the theory of enumeration , notably in the areas of survey sampling and effcient experimental design.
Fisher s theory culminated in fiducial inference , which to me and most current observers looks like a form of objective (as opposed to subjective) Bayesianism. I wil discuss the problems and promise of objective Bayesianism later, but it is interesting to notice that fiducial inference is alone among Fisher s major efforts in its failure to enter common statistical application. In its place, theNPW theory of confidence intervals dominates practice, despite some serious logical problems in its foundations.
THE NPW SCHOOL
Unlike Bayes and Fisher, the NPW school does not insist that there is a correct solution . for a given inferential situation. Instead, a par of the situation deemed most relevant to the investigator is split off , stated in narow mathematical fashion, and it is hoped, solved. For example, the correct Bayesian or Fisherian inference for in situation (1) leads directly to the correct inference for l' = 1/(1 + e), but this is not necessarly the case in the NPW formulation. (What is the uniform minimum varance unbiased estimate of 1'?) The NPW piecewise approach to statistical inference has been justly criticized by Bayesians as self-contradictory, / inconsistent, and incoherent. Because the medical investigators had little prior knowledge of the situation , the tree was constructed by an elaborate data-fitting procedure , which in fact was designed to maximize the apparent success rate. At each stage the dichotomous variable to be used and the splitting point defining " high" or " low " were chosen to give the maximum apparent difference between populations 1 and 2. A bootstrap analysis , much like a cross-validation , gave an unbiased estimate of successful prediction of death of about 70%, rather than 96. 7%, for this tree. (Details appear in sec. 7. 6 of Efron 1982a.
The fact that the observed data were used to constrct the tree , and how they were used , makes no difference to the Bayesian , since it has no effect on the likelihood function. This is similar in spirit to the fact that the stopping rule used in a sequential procedure has no Bayesian consequence. It makes a world of difference to the frequentist.
If exactly the same tree had been constructed by a less flexible rule , the unbiased estimate would move closer to the observed value 96. 7%. This is incoherent behavior. The Bayesian estimate, whatever it is, would not change.
Ad Of course there is no scientific law that says that objectivity must be interpreted in a frequentist sense, and in fact there is another line of Bayesian thought that attempts to deal directly with the issue of fairness. I call this " objective Bayes theory" to differentiate it from the Savage-de Finetti approach. Bayes and Laplace were objective Bayesians , and in this century, Jeffreys (1961) wrote a famous book on the subject. The goal of objective Bayesianism is to produce prior distrbutions that capture the idea of objectivity.
Consider situation (1) again. The obvious prior here is the improper one, spreading probability mass for uniformly from -00 to + 00 , often denoted simply by dO.
A Bayesian using this prior obtains good frequentist results. The central 90% aposteriori interval for 0, for example, agrees exactly with the standard 90% confidence interval.
Next consider the situation where we observe
which is just two independent copies of (1). In some recent work it was necessar for me to make inferences about the parameter A = 0 Oz. It seemed intuitively reasonable, and objective, to use the improper prior which spreads probability mass for (0 , Oz ) uniformly over the entire plane.
As Table 1 shows, the aposteriori central 90% probabilty 
(1, 10) 050 002 (006) 023 (036) 029 (041) 031 (046) 036 (048) 045 (053) 050 002 (006) 087 (065) 074 (053) 070 (047) 064 (043) 051 (053) NOTE: Figures In parenthesas are, easentlally, the same probabilities using the Improper prior (9 + 9 )'12 d9, d92.
The American Statistician, February 1986,
For the parameter A, Stein s theory suggests using the im. \
proper prior (Or + ODlIZ and None of these points is insurmountable, and in fact, there have been some Bayesian efforts on all four. In my opinion a lot more such effort wil be needed to fulfill Lindley prediction of a Bayesian 21st century. face.
Efron, B. (1982a),
The Jackknife, the Bootstrap, and Other Resampling The popularty of Fisherian theory stems in par from the byproducts of the analysis suggested by the theory. Analysis of varance is one of the most important data analytic tools in statistics. This tool stems from a hypothesis-testing formulation that is difficult to take seriously and would be of limited value for making final conclusions. Its importance stems from the fact that most scientific and statistical practice is concerned , not with grand final conclusions, but with many small steps gradually contrbuting clarty and order in moderately confused situations. Theory serves as a guide and enhances intuition , and it should not be used as a prescription requiring optimal behavior. Fisherian theory provides relatively simple, effective tools, the robustness of At this point, it is usually forgotten that a statistician ever played a useful role.
WHY EVERYONE IS, SHOULD BE OR WILL BE A BAYESIAN
How I Am a Bayesian
In doing applied statistics , I feel relatively uninhibited and engage in many practices that might be frowned on by careful dogmatists. With the help of theory, I have developed insights and intuitions that, I believe, prevent me from giving undue weight to generalizations drawn from excessive data dredging or other forms of statistical heresy. This feeling of ease and freedom, however , does not exist until Delaying such decisions is also potentially costly. Should we rely on the vagares of coin tossing, or uninformed public discussions , or the possibly slightly better scientific analysis? But scientific analysis in nuclear safety may, for lack of any real alternative , require a Bayesian fault tree analysis with priors based more on imagination than on real data.
One hopes that numbers so derived wil not have undue influence on a public impressed by quantification. 
D. V. LINDLEY*
Judging from the general thrst of the aricle , I presume that the "everyone " of the title is "every statistician " and the question wil be answered in that sense. The answer is simply that statisticians do not know what the Bayesian paradigm says. Why should they? There are very few universities in the world with statistics deparments that provide a good course in the subject. Only exceptional graduate students leave the field of their advisor and read for themselves. A secondar reason is that the subject is quite hard for someone who has been trained in the sampling-theory approach to understand. It may be that we Bayesians are poor writers, and certainly the seminal books by Jeffreys (1961 ( ) and de Finetti (1974 ( , 1975 are diffcult reading, but it took Savage (see the preface to Savage 1972) several years to understand what he had done; naturally, it took me longer. The subject is difficult. Some argue that this is a reason for not using it. But it is always harder to adhere to a strict moral code than to indulge in loose living.
What most statisticians have is a parody of the Bayesian argument , a simplistic view that just adds a woolly prior to , the sampling-theory paraphernalia. They look at the parody see how absurd it is , and thus dismiss the coherent approach as well. Efron has studied the Bayesian argument more than have most statisticians , but it is stil only a parody that is It is not tre that " Bayesian theory concentrates on inference. " If it concentrates on anything, it is decision analy-t sis and has often been unjustly accused of marketplace phi-: I losophy. It embraces all of the topics mentioned, including : r randomization and experimental design. It is a way of ; s thinking about things ; it is relevant to everyone (Lind-.
ley 1985).
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A gross parody is provided in the discussion of the hear attack decision tree. " The fact that the observed data were used. . . makes no difference to the Bayesian , since it has .
no effect on the likelihood function. is not doing very well at the moment and that it is the subjective approach that is developing. It is not tre that strct objectivity is one of the crucial factors separating scientific thinking from wishful thinking. " The objective element is the data: interpretation of data is subjective, as anyone who has interacted with scientists knows. Furthermore , the Bayesian view accepts the data; whereas the sampling-theory approach has to make a subjective embedding of them in a sample space. century, but Efron (1978) In short, this aricle is an attack on a parody of a serious argument, and because it is a parody it is easily abused.
Perhaps the author has been fallng over all those bootstraps lying around. Every statistician would be a Bayesian if he took the trouble to read the literature thoroughly and was honest enough to admit that he might have been wrong. We all have faced many inference problems for which we hold vague prior information about the parameter, so , vague that we readily abandon it when presente with sharr information from the experiment. In such cases we do not attempt to update our prior distrbution; we simply take directly the likelihood Li 0)
ADDITIONAL REFERENCES
as our posterior distrbution for after observing
Or we might improve this slightly by The first two of my reasons have also been given by
Efron; so we agree that these two issues are par of why everyone is not (yet) a Bayesian. Efron points out in his summar (Sec. 6) that " the high ground of scientific objectivity has been seized by the frequentists. " I agree with this conclusion , although I deplore the underlying rationale. It is my view that the Bayesian paradigm admits both objectivity and subjectivity, with the former appropriate for many situations involving scientific reporting and public policy decision making and the latter appropriate for all other situations. There are subjective, or personalistic , prior distributions that must be assessed for the subjective inference or decision making problem , and there are " vague " or " indifference" priors for the objective inference or decision making problem. But because so much attntion has been focused on the subjective aspets of Bayesian statistical procedures , we have tended to lose sight of the objectivity inherent in the approach , which was how Laplace saw the paradigm in the early 1800s, and which is how many Bayesian statisticians of the 20th century see the objectivity problem (e. , see Jaynes 1983 and Jeffeys 1961) . . Of course there are questions about which prior to use to express objectivity. Efron seeks the best method for accomplishing this; I applaud him for focusing on an issue that is , so important to the field of statistics. Bayesians wil tra-" ditionally use the improper uniform distrbution for unknowns lying on the whole real line (or they wil use the uniform distribution for the logs bf the unkowns when they lie on the positive axis). But we may be able to do better with an entirely new probabilty system. In Press (1985
It is clear that our field is in a transitional state. What is needed is a formal, axiomatic theory of probability which is conditional in the sense of Renyi and which permits probabilities on the entire real line.
In Section 3 Efron claims that " Bayesian theory concentrates on inference " although he acknowledges in Section 5 that " subjectivism is undoubtedly useful in situations involving personal decision makng, for example, business and legal decisions. " I must point out that the basic statistics course now typically presented in many business schools across the countr is a course in Bayesian decision making. Students are taught that much public policy decision makng on a day-to-day basis does not involve NPW -type analysis;
OS. James Press is Professor , Deparent of Statistics , University of California, Riverside, CA 92521. , ~ 1986 American Statistical Association Comment there is no time to collect any data; the decisions are made subjectively, using formal or informal priors. When data are collectible , students are taught to make decisions in a Bayesian way. Many well-read aricles and books attest to this fact (e. , see Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer 1964 , Raiffa 1968 , Raiffa and Schlaifer 1961 , Schlaifer 1969 , and Winkler 1972 . But because Bayesian decision making involves averaging only over the prior , or only over the posterior density conditional on the observed data , and not averaging over observations not yet taen (the entire sample space), and (therefore) because Bayesians are generally not concerned with admissibility, it is assumed that Bayesian procedures are largely inferential rather than decision theoretic. This impression should be revised.
In Section 3 Efron discusses the automated nature of Fishs theory, pointing out that the MLE " is the original jackknife , in Tukey s sense of a widely applicable and dependable tool." In the same sense that maximizing the likelihood functions is mechanical , so is the simple application of the Bayesian paradigm. In either the frequentist or the Bayesian approach , however , the statistician cannot use his tools mindlessly and mechanically. If he merely wishes to turn a crank , the frequentist can summarze his data with a likelihood function, and the Bayesian can , analogously, use a vague prior and summarze his beliefs with the induced posterior density. But what frequentistdoes not have to approach his problem gingerly when he knows in addition that 2 :5 () :5 5 , and in the context of the problem , () :: 3 makes little sense! The careful statistician does not apply his procedures mechanically, be he frequentist or Bayesian. The Bayesian has a formal introspection procedure for introducing his prior information , however, which for many problems is a great advantage. As Efron implies , however automating the procedure of Bayesian analysis (in the subjective case) has proved to be difficult. In SUnlar, it is only in actively seeking answers to the basic question Efron has raised that our field can begin to understand the real theoretical and applied adv:antages of one approach over another and ultimately arve at a unified foundational approach. wrote that "Bayesian thinking requires a fairly formal , strctured frame of discourse, and is thus not directly applicable to every kind of activity in which statisticians are involved. " I am very happy, therefore, to accept those pars of Efron analysis that are predicated on the recognition that " not all of statistics is inference. " This much is surely very common ground.
A great deal of theoretical and applied statistics is concerned , however , with analysis in the context of more-orless formal models, and here Efron himself acknowledges the " powerful theoretical reasons for preferrng Bayesian inference" and the " disturbing catalogue of inconsistencies in the frequentist point of view. " Why, then , in this inferential context, is everyone not a Bayesian? Efron s answer appears to be that the vast majority of statisticians are committed to an intuitive notion of statistical "fairess " nowhere defined but apparently common to concepts such as unbiasedness and confidence intervals and underpinning the key" (but also undefined!) concept of " scientific objectivity. "
Well, insofar as I understand this notion of " fairess, it appeals to long-run frequencies , violates an equally " intuitive" conditionality principle, and is thus directly responsible for those " disturbing inconsistencies " to which Efron refers. As for " scientific objectivity, " I personally am only able to make sense of the concept in the context of a Bayesian philosophy that predisposes one to seek to n report, openly and accessibly, a rich range of the possible belief mappings induced by a given data set , the range being, cI chosen to reflect and potentially to challenge the initial 0 perceptions of a broad class of interested paries. If a fairly shar consensus of views emerges from a rather wide spread of initial opinions , then , and only then, might it be mean " t( ingful to refer to " objectivity. " In the aricle previously, 0 referred to, I remarked that : tl one of the most attractive features of the Bayesian approach is its recog-IT nition of the legitimacy of a plurality of (coherently constrained) responses to data. Any approach to scientific inference which seeks to legitimize an ' e;
answer in response to complex uncertainty is , for me, a totalitaran parody of a would-be rational human learing process, (p. 250) The examples are genuine ones, suggested by my own picaresque adventures as an applied statistician in the Stanford Medical School. For instance, the product-of-normalmeans problem arose in the context of comparng two nonnested linear models (Efron 1984) . There is nothing paricularly strg or unusual about these examples , but of coure that was the point of my talk.
Here are a few brief comments on the commentares. I was surprised at how little support objectivity aroused.
Bringing some degree of consensus to the interpretation of noisy data is certainly one of our profession s principal accomplishments. Perhaps, as Smith suggests , we have purchased consensus at a high price in intellectual tyranny, but our scientific clientele seem happy to pay this price.
Understanding the' tre meaning of objectivity has occupied statistical thinkers from Bayes , Laplace , and Gauss to Fisher, Neyman , and Jeffreys. Fisher s phrase , " the logic of uncertain inference, " is parcularly evocative of a theory that goes from the data and a family of possible probability models to a consensus agreement of reasonable conclusions.
Such a theory does not yet fully exist, and may never exist , but I hope we have not given up looking for it. In the discussion , only Press had specific good words to say for objectivity. On the other hand , the empirical Bayes approach , very nicely stated by Morrs, has strong objective Bayes connections. These connections are made explicit in Good' s theory of Type II maximum likelihood (Good 1965 
